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WHEN A DELEGATION IS NOT A DELEGATION:
USING LEGISLATIVE MEANING TO
DEFINE STATUTORY GAPS
Robert J. Gregory*
It is often said that when Congress specifically delegates to an administra-
tive agency the responsibility for prescribing standards to implement statu-
tory language, a reviewing court must accord "legislative effect" to the
standards promulgated by the agency.' It is also generally understood that
when Congress expresses a specific intent as to the meaning of statutory lan-
guage, courts must give effect to that intent, notwithstanding a contrary in-
terpretation by the agency.2  At first glance, these seemingly
noncontroversial propositions appear wholly compatible. If Congress has
delegated the responsibility for prescribing standards to an agency, Congress
has not conveyed a specific intent as to the meaning of those standards. If
* Associate Attorney, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld (Washington, D.C.); J.D.,
Creighton University, 1985; Law Clerk, Hon. Thomas M. Shanahan, Nebraska Supreme Court
(1985-86); Attorney, Office of the Legislative Counsel, United States Senate (1986-1988).
1. Supreme Court cases giving legislative effect to agency regulations include: Atkins v.
Rivera, 477 U.S. 154, 162 (1986); United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 834 (1984); Herweg
v. Ray, 455 U.S. 265, 274-75 (1982); Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981);
Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424-26 (1977). In each of these cases, an agency exercised
rulemaking power pursuant to a specific delegation in its enabling statute. Professor Kenneth
Culp Davis argues that the same standard should apply even when the delegation occurs by
implication of an agency's general rulemaking power. See generally 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7:10, at 53-54 (2d ed. 1979) (arguing that any rule properly issued
under delegated power is a legislative rule entitled to substantial deference). This Article
agrees that the manner in which rulemaking is delegated should not significantly alter the
intensity of the judicial review of an agency's rule. See generally infra notes 104-29 and accom-
panying text (arguing that courts should not accord greater deference to agency rules issued
pursuant to a specific delegation than to rules promulgated under a general delegation). This
Article, however, rejects the application of the legislative effect standard, in any rulemaking
context, when it prevents a court from employing the traditional tools of statutory interpreta-
tion to determine whether an agency's construction of a statute is consistent with ascertainable
legislative meaning.
2. See, e.g., Bethesda Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 485 U.S. 399, 404 (1988) (finding that an
agency's "strained interpretation" of a statutory provision was "inconsistent with the express
language of the statute" and thus invalid); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 838, 843
n.9 (1984) (asserting that "[t]he judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construc-
tion and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional
intent"); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 118 (1978) (court should invalidate agency constructions
that are inconsistent with a statutory mandate).
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Congress has conveyed a specific intent as to the meaning of statutory lan-
guage, Congress has not delegated to the agency the responsibility for the
prescription of the statute.3
This analysis, however, overlooks the dynamics of the unique legislative
partnership between Congress and administrative agencies. Congress rou-
tinely delegates rulemaking power to agencies, thereby inviting agencies to
act in a legislative capacity and to promulgate standards when implementing
a statutory scheme. Despite this delegation, Congress may still have staked
out a substantial claim to lawmaking control over the standards the agency
will establish through rulemaking. Congress may invite the agency to com-
plete the legislative puzzle, but it may also specifically indicate what puzzle
pieces the agency cannot use and maybe some, or even many, of the pieces
the agency must use.4 If Congress seeks to direct an agency's hand, the gap
left for agency discretion is defined by discernible legislative meaning, not by
the scope of the agency's rulemaking power.'
3. These propositions could also be viewed as compatible to the extent that according
legislative effect to an agency regulation does not preclude judicial consideration of legislative
meaning in the review of the agency's implementation of a statutory provision. The Supreme
Court has suggested that agency regulations issued pursuant to a specific delegation are given
controlling weight unless they are "'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law.'" Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 426 (1977) (quoting 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988)). While this formulation conceivably allows for some consideration
of legislative intent, see, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (an agency rule is arbitrary and capricious "if the agency has relied on
factors which Congress has not intended it to consider"), it presumably would not counte-
nance a thorough search for legislative meaning in a statutory enactment subject to agency
construction. See 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 1, § 7:13, at 59 (arguing that a court is not free to
invalidate an agency rule issued pursuant to delegated power merely because the court dis-
agrees with the "content" of the rule). In practice, presumptively giving legislative effect to an
agency regulation, particularly when the congressional intent is not apparent on the face of the
statute, creates a substantial danger that a specific legislative meaning will be unenforced in the
administrative context. See infra notes 113-17 and accompanying text (discussing circum-
stances in which rules inconsistent with a specific meaning are at risk of being sustained if
accorded legislative effect).
4. This metaphor borrows heavily from Professor Henry P. Monaghan's illuminating
explication of the respective roles of court and agency in the application of statutory enact-
ments. See infra note 106 and accompanying text (quoting Monaghan, Marbury and the Ad-
ministrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 27 (1983)).
5. This Article uses the term "legislative meaning" to refer to the congressional intent
surrounding the meaning of statutory language. This intent as to the meaning of a statute is to
be distinguished from Congress' "interpretive intent" concerning the standards used in deter-
mining a statute's meaning. See Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133
U. PA. L. REV. 549, 570 (1985) (arguing that courts must follow the legislature's interpretive
intent as much as the legislature's "substantive intent" in determining whether to defer to an
agency's interpretation of a statute); Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power
in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 468 n.65 (1989) (noting that "interpretive
intent" refers to "Congress's intent not as to what the statute means, but as to the process by
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This Article examines how traditional principles of statutory interpreta-
tion interact with congressional delegation of rulemaking authority to ad-
ministrative agencies. It focuses specifically on a line of Supreme Court
decisions that only partially succeeds in reconciling this interaction. This
Article points out that when Congress instructs an agency to exercise its
rulemaking powers under a specific statutory standard, the Supreme Court
has clung to a fiction of statutory construction. If applied aggressively, this
canon of statutory construction would severely restrict the ability of the judi-
ciary to constrain agency decisionmaking within delegated authority.6 This
Article concludes by examining the issue of rulemaking delegations from the
perspective of the legislative draftsman, suggesting that the use of this fic-
tion, in particular, presents the draftsman with the dilemma of how to con-
trol the manner of agency decisionmaking without unintentionally
bestowing legislative effect on the product of the agency's rulemaking.
I. DELEGATIONS WITHIN DELEGATIONS: STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION IN THE MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
A. Background
The notion that Congress can delegate lawmaking authority to the other
branches of government did not originate with the creation of administrative
agencies.7 Well before the full-scale erection of the modern administrative
which that meaning is to be ascertained"). For this Article's view of how these two competing
expressions of congressional intent should be resolved in the context of rulemaking delega-
tions, see infra notes 104-22 and accompanying text (arguing that a specific rulemaking delega-
tion does not provide a sufficiently strong "interpretive intent" of judicial deference to permit a
court to ignore a discernible "substantive intent" that conflicts with the agency's construction).
6. See infra notes 40-66 and accompanying text (analyzing the Court's view that a spe-
cific rulemaking delegation indicates Congress' intent that a court defer to the agency's con-
struction of the statutory provision).
7. In this Article, "lawmaking" refers to the creative process by which both courts and
agencies assign meaning to statutory provisions subject to their application or administration.
Under this conception, Congress delegates lawmaking power to courts or agencies anytime the
legislation fails to articulate a legislative meaning that can be ascertained-with some degree of
certainty-from the statutory enactment in question. See generally Luneburg, Nonoriginalist
Interpretation A Comment on Federal Question Jurisdiction and Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals
Inc. v. Thompson, 48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 757, 758 n.7 (1987) (" 'judicial lawmaking' refer[s] to
the results of statutory analyses that are not firmly rooted in the original intent of the legisla-
ture which enacted the statute but, for example, in the court's sense of the current social,
political and legal landscape"). In contrast, rulemaking is the process by which agencies enact
statements of "general or particular applicability and future effect" in their administration of
statutory law. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1988). Rulemaking typically will involve a creative compo-
nent, but its exercise will often be constrained by a specific legislative meaning that narrows the
agency's lawmaking authority. This Article argues that the scope of the implied lawmaking
delegation, not the rulemaking delegation, should determine the degree of deference to agency
action.
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state, commentators recognized that legislatures implicitly delegated law-
making authority whenever they enacted statutory provisions without con-
veying an ascertainable legislative meaning.' Indeed, the perceived inability
or unwillingness of legislators to make clear the manner in which courts
were to apply statutes led some early commentators to conclude that judges,
acting in their "interpretative" capacities, were the primary, if not exclusive,
lawmakers. 9 John Chipman Gray, one of the leading proponents of that
view, argued that statutes were "at the mercy of courts," because courts
have "the last say as to what is and what is not Law in a community.""I
According to Professor Gray, legislators frequently formed no "real inten-
tion" concerning a statute's application, leaving the judiciary free to legislate
with virtually unlimited discretion."
Not all commentators have viewed the courts' lawmaking role from the
broad perspective of realists like Gray. 2 Still, it is widely recognized that
because legislators can hardly be expected to illuminate every conceivable
facet of a statute's application, courts will be compelled, at some point, to fill
in the gaps in legislative meaning by assigning their own meaning to the
statutory language-in effect, by lawmaking. 3 Judge Benjamin Cardozo ob-
8. See generally B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113-41 (1921)
(describing the view that judges act as legislators when filling gaps in statutes, constitutions,
and the common law).
9. In contrast, the Supreme Court strained hard, even when addressing an executive
branch action, to avoid the implication that the application of statutes to individual cases
involved the exercise of lawmaking responsibility. See, e.g., Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692-
93 (1892) (ruling that the President was merely the "agent" of Congress in exercising largely
discretionary statutory authority to impose retaliatory tariffs).
10. J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 171-72, 181 (2d ed. 1921).
11. Id. at 173. Gray conceded that there were limits on the judiciary's "power of interpre-
tation," but argued that these limits were too "undefined" to constrain judicial lawmaking. Id.
at 125. Thus, statutes are merely one source of law; "all the Law is judge-made law." Id.
(emphasis added).
12. Gray and his contemporaries in the "Progressive" movement of statutory interpreta-
tion believed in the "unitary nature of common law elaboration and statutory interpretation."
Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and Substance, 6 CARDOZO L.
REV. 799, 823 (1985). Gray, in particular, rejected the view that "the function of the judge
[should] be deemed only that of attempting to reproduce in his own mind the thought of the
lawgiver." J. GRAY, supra note 10, at 171. Contra Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the
Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817 (1983) (positing model of "im-
aginative reconstruction" under which a judge is to place herself in the minds of the enacting
legislators). Gray argued that unless "compelled by the precise words of a statute," the judge
was not required to "follow ... the notions of the community" in deciding specific cases. J.
GRAY, supra note 10, at 288.
13. The lawmaking role of courts has been recognized even under essentially intentionalist
models of statutory interpretation. E.g., R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLI-
CATION OF STATUTES 238-61 (1975). For the intentionalist, judicial lawmaking is derived, if
possible, from the general purpose of the statute as originally enacted. Alternatively, commen-
[Vol. 39:725
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served that, within the confines of the open spaces left by the governing law,
judicial choice "moves with a freedom which stamps its action as creative.
The law which is the resulting product is not found, but made.'
4
On the other hand, the general reluctance of the courts to embrace openly
their lawmaking role in applying statutes is well-documented.' 5 Even where
the statutory language is steeped in generalities, and the legislative history is
murky, courts have justified a particular holding by manufacturing a specific
legislative intent based on a substantial, but unstated, creative component.
16
The lack of candor in the courts' approach to statutory interpretation has
induced the expected reaction from disgruntled scholars, who have assailed
the complex array of fictitious devices invoked by courts in lieu of stand-
ards that give visible effect to the true dynamics of interpretative
decisionmaking. 7
Achieving candor indeed has been one of the primary themes of the volu-
minous scholarly writing on statutory interpretation.'" Another theme has
been how to reconcile the recognition that courts can wield substantial law-
making power with the constitutional principle of separation of powers,
tators have argued, under a variety of conceptions, that courts should be free to update statutes
in light of modem understandings and values, at least where no specific legislative meaning
otherwise controls. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REv.
20, 46-61 (1988) (describing "nautical" approach to statutory interpretation). Under this view,
the lawmaking function is exercised without reference to the historical context of the original
enactment. See generally Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
1479, 1498-1501 (1987) (defending the "majority view" that judges possess limited lawmaking
power not tied rigidly to original legislative intent).
14. B. CARDOZO, supra note 8, at 115.
15. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982) (ob-
serving that courts have not "own[ed] up" to their creative role in the application of statutes).
16. For a recent criticism of the Supreme Court's use of a contrived historical intent as
camouflage for a "result-oriented" interpretation of a statute, see Eskridge, supra note 13, at
1484-86 (advocating that instead of relying on an "indeterminate" historical context, a court
should determine what interpretation is most consistent with the provision in question "as it
has evolved over time").
17. See, e.g., Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930). In his cri-
tique of the judicial approach to statutory interpretation, Professor Radin illuminated the pre-
vailing tension between the scholarly search for candor in statutory interpretation and the
judiciary's reliance on what Radin characterized as "the cardboard structures of technical
devices." Id. at 885. Radin was particularly critical of the judiciary's reliance on the " 'golden
rule' " that intent governs the meaning of a statute, arguing that legislative intent was "undis-
coverable in any real sense" and "irrelevant if it were discovered." Id. at 870, 872. See gener-
ally Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 731-32 (1987)
(describing the tension between the judge's role and "the principles of candor that are thought
so indispensable to the scholar's function").
18. See, e.g., Luneburg, supra note 7, at 758 (noting that "[s]ince lawmaking may form a
significant element in statutory interpretation, candor by the courts in what they are doing
would seem to be clearly called for").
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which most commentators regard as requiring that the legislative branch be
supreme in the formulation of public policy.' 9 Presumably, if a court can
derive a specific legislative intent from a statutory enactment, then the court
should give effect to that intent, notwithstanding its own views on wise pub-
lic policy.' ° On the other hand, purporting to find a specific legislative intent
where none exists hardly serves to further legislative supremacy and invaria-
bly breeds confusion and suspicion regarding the role of the courts in the
interpretative process.
The academic yearning for both candor and legitimacy in statutory inter-
pretation is well represented in the writings of Professor Reed Dickerson.
Professor Dickerson, a strong proponent of legislative supremacy in law-
making, has argued that courts must differentiate when dealing with statutes
between the ascertainment of meaning (the cognitive function) and the as-
signment of meaning (the creative function).21 On the one hand, the "con-
stitutional mandate" of legislative supremacy requires that cognition precede
creation and that a court exhaust all methods of discerning legislative mean-
ing before the court adds its own lawmaking to a statute.22 On the other
hand, when a court cannot "confidently" ascertain a controlling legislative
meaning, and must thereby enter the generative domain of lawmaking to
decide a case, it serves no useful purpose for the court to pretend that the
meaning assigned to the statutory provision was the specific meaning in-
tended by the enacting legislature.23
19. See Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 22-32 (discussing how traditional approaches to statu-
tory interpretation seek to preserve legislative supremacy).
20. But see Blatt, supra note 12, at 802-05 (describing the historical origin of the doctrine
of equitable construction, under which courts may give effect to the equity of a statute notwith-
standing a discernible legislative meaning to the contrary).
21. R. DICKERSON, supra note 13, at 7, 13-21. Professor Dickerson is careful to note that
the "supremacy of the legislature in formulating social policy" is not challenged by the view,
which he accepts, "that within circumscribed areas the courts, too, make law." Id. at 9.
22. Id. at 19-21. Professor Dickerson, responding to Professor Radin's criticism of the
intentionalist approach, argues that courts should seek to ascertain the intent manifested by
the statute and its context, not the actual intent of the legislators. While the manifest intent
may not match the subjective intent of the enacting legislature, there is "no practical alterna-
tive to assuming that the manifest intent is the actual intent, until new appropriate evidence is
available or the legislature enacts a corrective amendment." Id. at 85.
23. Id. at 222. Professor Dickerson identifies several situations in which lawmaking is
exercised by courts, only one of which is characterized as an actual delegation of legislative
power. Id. at 238-39 (lawmaking is "akin to 'delegated legislation'" when "the statutory man-
date is so general that the court is impliedly invited, and indeed compelled, to supplement it
with more specific rules"). For simplicity, this Article assumes that a "delegation" of lawmak-
ing power occurs whenever Congress has failed to evince a clearly discernible legislative mean-
ing that controls the case at hand.
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B The Administrative Agency as Interpretative Actor
In principle, the concerns that have prompted commentators to seek can-
dor and legitimacy in the statutory interpretations of courts should apply
with equal force to the interpretations of administrative agencies. The
United States Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that agencies, like
courts, must maintain strict fidelity to congressional intent.24 Agencies have
no independent policymaking powers that permit them to ignore the ex-
pressed will of Congress, nor can agencies be influenced by their own views
of public policy when ascertaining the legislative meaning assigned by Con-
gress.2" Agencies are part of a political branch of government, which might
be justification for preferring their lawmaking to a court's,26 but agencies can
no more legitimately turn to lawmaking in lieu of discerning legislative in-
tent than can their interpretative counterparts in the judiciary.
Even if courts and agencies are equally subordinate to the legislative
branch in their exercise of lawmaking powers, some differences exist in the
manner in which agencies carry out those powers. Agencies are generally
empowered to provide meaning to a statute in the course of case-by-case
adjudication. In this regard, the agency acts in the capacity of a court. An
agency, however, may also have the power to issue interpretative rulings or
promulgate regulations that affect a broad class of interests subject to gov-
ernmental regulation. 27 In the latter context, the agency truly acts in a legis-
24. See, e.g., NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S.
112, 123 (1987) (stating that when a court is able "to determine congressional intent using
'traditional tools of statutory construction' ... that interpretation must be given effect, and the
regulations at issue must be fully consistent with it"); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467
U.S. 838, 842-43 (1984) (asserting that "the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress").
25. Thus, a reviewing court's inquiry into congressional intent is conducted without defer-
ence to the agency. "In conducting this inquiry, [the court is] 'not required to grant any
particular deference to the agency's parsing of statutory language or its interpretation of legis-
lative history.'" Washington Hosp. Center v. Bowen, 795 F.2d 139, 143 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(quoting Rettig v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 744 F.2d 133, 141 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
26. See Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. at 865 (noting that while courts cannot "reconcile com-
peting political interests ... on the basis of the judges' personal policy preferences, .. . an
agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of
that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to
inform its judgments"); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (stating that "[a]s long
as the agency remains within the bounds established by Congress, it is entitled to assess admin-
istrative records and evaluate priorities in light of the philosophy of the administration") (foot-
note omitted).
27. In some circumstances, it may not be clear whether Congress has delegated substan-
tive rulemaking power to an agency in the agency's enabling statute. Generally, courts have
liberally construed agency enabling statutes to find substantive rulemaking authority. See, e.g.,
E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 126-33 (1977) (liberally construing
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lative capacity possessing the affirmative power to proscribe conduct
prospectively divorced from the limits of individual adjudications.28 To the
extent that they possess rulemaking authority, agencies, unlike courts, can
affirmatively set the agenda for their own action. As executive actors, agen-
cies enjoy substantial discretion in their enforcement of the statutes they
administer.29
Because agencies are not bound by the constraints of passive decisionmak-
ing, they often act in a legislative capacity when implementing and adminis-
tering the statutory schemes Congress entrusts to them. Congress creates
agencies and endows them with rulemaking powers precisely to enable them
to build upon the legislative infrastructure Congress erected. Congress can-
not be expected to provide every detail for the myriad federal programs that
it has created over the years. Therefore, Congress equips agencies with
rulemaking powers to complete the legislative task.
The delegation of legislative rulemaking to agencies can arise in two
ways.3 ° Congress can delegate rulemaking by expressly directing or author-
izing an agency to prescribe legislative standards. Thus, Congress, in "free-
agency's enabling statute to find that agency could set administrative limitations by regula-
tion); In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 653 F.2d 514, 522-24 (D.C. Cir.) (en
banc) (interpreting agency's authority to " 'publish and promulgate such rules and regulations
as may be necessary to carry out the purposes and provisions of [the enabling statute]'" as
conferring "substantive authority"), cert. denied, sub. nom. Peabody Coal Co. v. Watt, 454
U.S. 822 (1981).
28. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
14 (1947) (describing rulemaking as "agency action which regulates the future conduct of
either groups of persons or a single person; it is essentially legislative in nature, not only be-
cause it operates in the future but also because it is primarily concerned with policy
considerations").
29. See generally 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 1, § 9:1, at 216-220 (discussing the broad agency
discretion not to enforce statutory provisions).
30. As Professor Davis has observed, all agencies have the "intrinsic" power to issue in-
terpretative rules in the sense that agencies must resolve "questions the statute does not an-
swer" and must provide instruction to program administrators. Id. § 7:11, at 55; K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7:8, at 173 (Supp. 1982). "Legislative" or "substantive"
rulemaking, which involves the power to promulgate rules with the "force of law," can arise
only by congressional delegation. 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 1, § 7:8, at 36-37 (describing a
legislative rule as "the product of an exercise of delegated legislative power to make law
through rules"). Although Professor Davis apparently would give legislative effect to any reg-
ulation properly promulgated under a statutory delegation of rulemaking, this Article asserts
that even rules issued under a "substantive" delegation of rulemaking authority cannot be
upheld if they are inconsistent with a clearly discernible legislative meaning evinced by Con-
gress. The Supreme Court's decision in Chevron lends support to this assertion. See infra
notes 77-80 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's view that a regulation
promulgated under a general delegation is not presumptively accorded "legislative effect"); see
also Permanent Surface Mining, 653 F.2d at 523 (even though an agency has statutory author-
ity to promulgate regulations with "substantive authority," the regulations cannot be "incon-
sistent with the Act").
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standing" legislative language,31 can tell an agency to issue regulations to
implement specific provisions. Often, Congress will signal this intent
through the "amendatory" language by affixing the words "as determined in
accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary," or similar language,
to a specific statutory provision.32 Congress can also delegate rulemaking by
assigning general rulemaking power to an agency for the implementation of
a statutory program. Depending on the wording of the general rulemaking
grant, the agency's rulemaking authority may extend to the implementation
of a specific provision in its enabling statute even though there is no direct
legislative signal to that effect.33
Within this administrative framework of rulemaking delegations, Con-
gress often will leave statutory gaps for an agency to fill. Inside these gaps,
the agency should be free to carry out its implementing role without inten-
sive judicial oversight. The key question is how this area of agency discre-
tion is to be determined.34 If the area of discretion is viewed as coterminous
with the scope of the agency's rulemaking delegation ("rulemaking gap"),
31. This Article uses the term "freestanding" to refer to legislative language that is not
included in the amendments made by a public law to an underlying statute. Typically, a free-
standing delegation of rulemaking will require or authorize an agency head to issue regulations
implementing the amendments made by a particular section or subsection of a bill. The free-
standing delegation will not appear in the text of the compilation of the statute being amended
because the delegation is not included in the statutory amendment itself.
32. This Article uses the term "amendatory" to refer to legislative language that is in-
cluded within the amendments made by a public law to an underlying statute. An amendatory
delegation becomes a part of the statute being amended and will appear in the text of any
compilation of that statute. For a discussion of the possible significance of distinguishing be-
tween freestanding and amendatory delegations in legislative drafting, see infra notes 141-46
and accompanying text (suggesting that the use of freestanding delegations may avoid applica-
tion of the deferential standard of review that the Supreme Court has accorded to a certain
type of amendatory delegation).
33. See cases cited supra note 27 (general delegation held to trigger rulemaking authority).
The terms used in this Article to describe the types of rulemaking delegations, general and
specific, differ from the terminology employed by the Supreme Court. This Article uses the
term "specific delegation" to refer to what the Court has characterized as an "express" delega-
tion. See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 (1977). The Article refers to delegations as
general and specific, rather than express and implied, to avoid confusion with the Supreme
Court's recognition of explicit and implicit statutory gaps of substantial agency discretion. See
infra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's juxtaposition, in Chev-
ron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, of explicit gaps created by rulemaking delegation and implicit gaps
created by lawmaking delegation). In any event, the express and implied terminology does not
accurately distinguish between types of delegations because even general delegations are ex-
pressly made. See, e.g., Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers,
861 F.2d 1124, 1141 (9th Cir. 1988) (Hug, J., dissenting) (noting that a general delegation is
really an "express" delegation of authority "to develop the specifics of general legislation")
(emphasis in original).
34. The term "discretion" as used in this Article does not carry the same meaning as used
in section 701 of the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1988).
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the agency's implementation of a statute, which could include a substantial
interpretative component, would be largely immune from judicial scrutiny.
If, instead, the area of discretion is defined in terms of the legislative mean-
ing conveyed through the enactment of substantive provisions ("lawmaking
gap"), the agency would be forced to adhere to congressional intent in ac-
cordance with the judicial model of implied lawmaking discussed above.
Under this approach, there would be, in many cases, an implied delegation
of lawmaking authority (the degree of deference) that is narrower than the
agency's delegated rulemaking authority.
There are cases, including Supreme Court decisions, that provide support
for determining statutory gaps based on an agency's rulemaking authority.3"
Under the rulemaking gap theory, regulations issued pursuant to a statutory
delegation are entitled to "legislative effect" or "controlling weight" because
they complete the legislative scheme left unfinished by Congress.36 In count-
less other cases, however, courts have engaged in a searching examination of
statutory context and legislative history to find that an agency regulation
issued under the auspices of a rulemaking delegation conflicts with congres-
sional intent and is, therefore, invalid.37 In these cases, courts do not hold
35. See, e.g., United States v. Mersky, 361 U.S. 431, 437-38 (1960) ("regulations, called
for by the statute itself, have the force of law" in that "neither the statute nor the regulations
are complete without the other"); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Scarlett, 300 U.S. 471, 474 (1937)
(regulation issued "in pursuance of constitutional authority... has the same force as though
prescribed in terms by the statute"); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232,
236-37 (1936) (when Congress grants an agency discretionary authority to prescribe rules, a
court may not "substitute its own discretion for that of administrative officers who have kept
within the bounds of their administrative powers"). See generally Saunders, Interpretative
Rules with Legislative Effect: An Analysis and a Proposal for Public Participation, 198 DUKE
L.J. 346, 353-54 (1986) (arguing that these cases support the view that agency interpretations
made under rulemaking authority "have legislative effect").
36. See infra notes 41-66 and accompanying text (discussing cases according legislative
effect to regulations issued under specific rulemaking delegations); see also Telecommunica-
tions Research & Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 514 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.) (be-
cause the agency was charged with "prescrib[ing] appropriate rules and regulations to carry
out" statutory provisions, the agency's construction of the statute was entitled to deference
absent compelling reasons to hold otherwise).
37. In several recent cases, the Supreme Court has invalidated regulations that were
deemed inconsistent with a specific congressional intent derived from the language, context,
and legislative history of a statute. See, e.g., NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers
Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 123-24 (1987); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 427-43
(1987); Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 369-73 (1986). An older
line of cases invokes a similar analysis. See, e.g., FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign
Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981) (citing long line of Supreme Court cases in asserting that a
reviewing court "must reject administrative constructions of the statute, whether reached by
adjudication or by rulemaking, that are inconsistent with the statutory mandate or that frus-
trate the policy that Congress sought to implement").
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the rulemaking delegation to require any more deference to the agency's in-
terpretation than would otherwise be supplied.
38
In recent years, the Supreme Court has trod a path into the middle of this
interpretative quagmire. The Court has flirted with the approach of de-
lineating agency discretion on the basis of rulemaking gaps,39 while continu
ing to press for strict adherence to congressional intent in reviewing agency
interpretations.' These Supreme Court cases, viewed together, appear to
indicate that the manner in which Congress delegates rulemaking authority
results in different standards of judicial deference. In effect, the lawmaking
gap analysis will apply where the delegation is general; the rulemaking gap
approach will apply where it is specific.
C. Batterton v. Francis: The Rulemaking Gap Approach
The linchpin of the United States Supreme Court's decisions where
rulemaking meets lawmaking is Batterton v. Francis.41 Batterton involved a
challenge to a regulation that defined the term "unemployment" in deter-
mining eligibility under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) program.42 The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare is-
sued the regulation pursuant to a specific delegation contained in the text of
the AFDC statute. Specifically, the statute defined a "'dependent child'"
38. Even when rulemaking is not involved, the Supreme Court has invoked deference to
an agency's construction of a statutory scheme it is charged with administering. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944) (agency's application of a broad
statutory term under the program administered by the agency is entitled to deference if there is
"reasonable basis in record" to support it). In Chevron, the Supreme Court announced a stan-
dard that "always" applies "[w]hen a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute
which it administers." 467 U.S. at 842 (emphasis added). As the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently observed, the Chevron decision "make[s]
clear that [its] approach applies equally to agency rulemaking and to agency adjudication."
Midtech Paper Corp. v. United States, 857 F.2d 1487, 1497 (D.C. Cir. 1988). While there still
may be some questions concerning the application of Chevron in different "interpretive for-
mats," see Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Get Judicial Deference?-A Prelimi-
nary Inquiry, 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 121, 137 (1988) (suggesting that Chevron should not apply
"to interpretations set forth in formats that do not carry the force of law"), the Court appears
to have rejected the argument, as a general matter, that an agency construction deserves more
deference solely because the construction followed a rulemaking. See infra notes 77-80 and
accompanying text (describing how the Court in Chevron rejected approach of according legis-
lative effect to any regulation issued under a statutory rulemaking delegation).
39. See infra notes 41-66 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court cases holding
that regulations issued under specific rulemaking delegation are entitled to legislative effect).
40. See infra notes 68-102 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court cases re-
quiring a reviewing court to invalidate an agency construction that is inconsistent with a legis-
lative intent clearly discernible from the context and legislative history of a statute).
41. 432 U.S. 416 (1977).
42. The AFDC program is part A of title IV of the Social Security Act, codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 601-617 (1988).
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under the program as having been "'deprived of parental support or care by
reason of the unemployment (as determined in accordance with standards
prescribed by the Secretary) of his father.' ,43 A group of plaintiffs claimed
that the regulation was inconsistent with congressional intent, and, thus, in-
valid, because the regulation permitted states to exclude individuals from the
program based on the reason for a father's unemployment.
4
In rejecting the plaintiffs' argument, the Court focused on the nature of
the rulemaking delegation. Stressing that Congress had specifically dele-
gated to the Secretary the authority to set standards for determining what
constitutes "unemployment," the Court observed:
In a situation of this kind, Congress entrusts to the Secretary,
rather than to the courts, the primary responsibility for interpret-
ing the statutory term. In exercising that responsibility, the Secre-
tary adopts regulations with legislative effect. A reviewing court is
not free to set aside those regulations simply because it would have
interpreted the statute in a different manner.45
Based on this analysis, the Court determined that the Secretary's regula-
tion defining "unemployment" could be set aside only if the Secretary "ex-
ceeded his statutory authority or if the regulation was 'arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.' ,46 The
Court then engaged in a halfhearted examination of the statutory language
and legislative history.47 Not surprisingly, given the deferential lens through
which the Court conducted its review of the pertinent legislative materials,
43. 432 U.S. at 418 n.2 (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 607(a) (1988)). Thus, the
statute contained a specific "amendatory" rulemaking delegation. See supra notes 31-32 and
accompanying text (describing specific freestanding and amendatory delegations).
44. 432 U.S. at 417-18 n.1.
45. Id. at 425 (citation omitted).
46. Id. at 426 (quoting 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A),(C) (1988)). The quoted formulation of the
standard of review, appropriated from a pertinent section of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 10(e), 60 Stat. 243, 243-44 (1946), generally signals broad defer-
ence to any reasonable agency construction of the statute. See generally ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 220-
21 (1983) (the standard of review tests the "substantive reasonableness of the rule").
47. The structure of the Court's opinion reveals the crucial distinction between the analy-
sis employed in Batterton and the standard enunciated in Chevron USA., Inc. v. NRDC In
Batterton, the Court reviewed the relevant legislative sources after it had given legislative effect
to the agency's construction. Under the Chevron approach, the reviewing court defers to the
agency's construction only when there is no clearly expressed congressional intent to the con-
trary. Accordingly, the court gives legislative effect to an agency's construction, if at all, as the
result of the court's independent analysis of the statute, the statute's context, and the relevant
legislative history. See infra notes 83-92 and accompanying text (discussing proper interpreta-
tion of Chevron).
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the Court concluded that the Secretary's regulation was "reasonable" and,
thus, valid.48
Significantly, the Court distinguished its approach in Batterton from that
taken in a previous case involving a challenge to the Social Security Board's
interpretation of the term "wages" under title II of the Social Security Act.49
In Social Security Board v. Nierotko, the Court held that the Board's inter-
pretation of "wages," which excluded back pay, conflicted with the meaning
intended by Congress. The Court noted that Congress had not "delegated
[power] to the Social Security Board to determine what compensation paid
by employers to employees should be treated as wages." 50  In contrast,
allegedly because of Congress' specific delegation of rulemaking, the Bat-
terton Court viewed the agency's interpretation with substantial deference.
Whereas Congress' use of a "well understood word - 'wages'," in the Social
Security Act imposed meaningful constraints on the range of the agency's
interpretative choices,5" Congress' use of the word "unemployment" was ac-
corded no such limiting effect.52
The Batterton Court suggested two bases for its apparent view that the
scope of the agency's rulemaking responsibility defined the area of agency
discretion. First, the Court intimated that by specifically delegating
rulemaking authority to define the statutory term "unemployed," Congress
had signified its interpretive intent that the agency's views on legislative
meaning take precedence over the judiciary's.5 3 Thus, notwithstanding any
countervailing interpretation that could be derived from application of the
traditional tools of ascertaining legislative meaning, the agency's construc-
tion of the term was to be given legislative effect.54 Under this rulemaking
gap approach, the specific delegation of rulemaking to the agency served as
48. 432 U.S. at 431-32.
49. Social Sec. Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358 (1946).
50. Id. at 369. The decisions of both the Social Security Board and the Bureau of Internal
Revenue expressed the view that back pay was not included within the statutory definition of
"wages." Both agencies were "charged with the administration of the Social Security Act."
IM. at 366-67. In addition, these agencies had general rulemaking authority, but had not exer-
cised this authority with respect to the back pay question. Id. at 366 n. 17. The Court con-
ceded that the "expert judgment" of the two administrative bodies was entitled to "great
weight," but asserted that "[a]n agency may not finally decide the limits of its statutory
power." Id at 368-69.
51. Id. at 369.
52. Batterton, 432 U.S. at 427-28.
53. Although the Court did not use the interpretive intent terminology, see supra note 5
for a discussion of the distinction between Congress' interpretive intent and its intent as to the
meaning of a statute, the Court construed the specific rulemaking delegation to mean that
Congress had "entrust[ed] to the Secretary, rather than to the courts, the primary responsibil-
ity for interpreting the statutory term." Id at 425.
54. Id at 429.
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an "intention override." Having supposedly given broad discretion to the
agency to formulate legislative standards, Congress cannot be held to have
reached any specific intent as to the content of those standards, at least not
an intent that a reviewing court could enforce.
As additional support for a deferential approach to the Secretary's regula-
tion, the Court invoked the distinction between legislative and interpretative
rules." The Court emphasized that legislative rules, which are "'issued by
an agency pursuant to statutory authority,' " have the "'force and effect of
law.' "36 In contrast, only "[v]arying degrees of deference" are accorded
interpretative rules, "based on such factors as the timing and consistency of
the agency's position, and the nature of its expertise."' 17 Because the agency
had properly promulgated its regulation pursuant to a specific delegation in
the AFDC statute, the regulation constituted a legislative rule that was enti-
tled to substantial deference by the Court.5"
Neither of the bases asserted by the Court to support its decision in Bat-
terton can be characterized as novel. The legislative-interpretative rule dis-
tinction is well established, if not clearly defined.59 Further, the notion that
a rulemaking delegation signals heightened deference to an agency's distilla-
tion of legislative meaning is not without historical support.'o Nevertheless,
the Court's explication of these principles, particularly its reliance on the
specific nature of the rulemaking delegation, did chart new ground.61 A lit-
55. The distinction between legislative and interpretative rules is suggested by 5 U.S.C.
§ 553 (1988), which requires "[g]eneral notice of proposed rule making" in the Federal Regis-
ter for any "substantive rule," and exempts from the notice requirement "interpretative rules,
general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice." Id.
§§ 553(b), (b)(A), (d). While the APA does not apply this distinction when reviewing agency
decisions, Professor Davis, in particular, has argued, partially on the basis of the legislative
history of the APA, that "the scope of review of interpretative rules is greater than for legisla-
tive rules." 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 1, § 7:8, at 37. Professor Davis would accord legislative
effect to legislative rules. Although some modern case law supports distinguishing between
legislative and interpretative rules in reviewing an administrative construction, the distinction
has not had the influence that Professor Davis strains to demonstrate in his treatise. See infra
notes 122-26 and accompanying text (arguing that the distinction does not provide persuasive
support for the Batterton legislative effect standard).
56. 432 U.S. at 425 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL
ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT 30 n.3 (1947)).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Arrow Air, Inc. v. Dole, 784 F.2d 1118, 1122-23 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (setting
forth five factors "applicable in determining whether a given rule is substantive or
interpretative").
60. See supra note 35 (citing older Supreme Court cases that provide support for the
rulemaking gap approach).
61. While previous Supreme Court cases suggested a basis for according legislative effect
to rules issued under delegated authority, the Batterton Court's formulation of a standard of
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eral reading of the Court's opinion indicates that the search for specific legis-
lative meaning, previously pivotal to preserving legislative supremacy in
public policymaking, is to be abandoned whenever Congress delegates
rulemaking power to an agency. The scope of the rulemaking delegation,
not the legislative meaning, determined the breadth of the statutory gap in-
side which the agency can act with substantial, albeit not unlimited,
discretion.
In post-Batterton cases, the Court reiterated its position that a regulation
issued pursuant to a specific delegation is entitled to legislative effect.62 In
Schweiker v. Gray Panthers,63 for example, the Court again faced statutory
language that provided for the establishment of an eligibility requirement,
under the federal Medicaid program, "in accordance with standards pre-
scribed by the Secretary."" The Court, quoting from Batterton, emphasized
that Congress had entrusted the agency with " 'primary responsibility for
interpreting the statutory term.' ,,6S While the Court was not to "abdicate
review in these circumstances," the Court's task was the "limited one of
ensuring that the Secretary did not "'exceed his statutory authority.' "66
D. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC: The Lawmaking Gap Approach
The Court's emerging views on specific rulemaking delegations raised an
obvious question: Should the same standard of judicial deference apply to
regulations promulgated under general rulemaking authority? As discussed
above, even when an agency is not directed to prescribe legislative standards,
general rulemaking powers, by implication, may authorize the agency to ex-
ercise rulemaking in implementing a statutory provision.67 The question
then arises whether the rulemaking gap approach should apply in that cir-
review, purportedly based on the distinction between specific and general rulemaking delega-
tions, was at least novel. But see 2 K. DAvIS, supra note 1, § 7:8, at 41 (arguing that Batterton
"makes no new law" but simply confirms "that the old law continues").
62. See supra note 1 (citing post-Batterton Supreme Court cases according legislative ef-
fect to agency regulations issued pursuant to specific rulemaking delegations). See also INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 986 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (noting that "[w]hen agencies are
authorized to prescribe law through substantive rulemaking, the administrator's regulation is
not only due deference, but is accorded 'legislative effect' ") (quoted in Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 714, 752 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
63. 453 U.S. 34 (1981).
64. Id. at 44. Thus, as in Batterton, the rulemaking delegation was set forth in the body of
the statute itself, rather than in freestanding legislative language. See supra notes 31-32 and
accompanying text (distinguishing between freestanding and amendatory statutory language).
65. 453 U.S. at 44 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(17)(B) (1988)).
66. Id.
67. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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cumstance. If so, on what basis? If not, what approach should apply and
what justification exists for distinguishing between the two situations?
The United States Supreme Court addressed these questions in the well-
known case of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC.6" Chevron involved a chal-
lenge to a regulation promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) that adopted a plant wide definition of the term "stationary source"
as used in the Clean Air Act.69 Congress did not specifically instruct the
EPA to issue the regulation, but the EPA's enabling statute included a grant
of general rulemaking power.70 The NRDC claimed that the agency's con-
struction of the statute was invalid, and the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed.71
The Supreme Court rejected this claim, finding that the agency's interpre-
tation represented a "reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing
interests."72 The Court enunciated a two-step process for reviewing an
agency's "construction of a statutory scheme [that the agency] is entrusted
to administer."73 According to the Court, the first question is "always"
whether Congress "has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If
68. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In Rowan Companies, Inc. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247
(1981), the Court suggested that less deference should be given to an agency regulation issued
under general rulemaking authority because the judiciary can "measure" the agency's interpre-
tation "against a specific provision in the [statute]." Id. at 253. Significantly, the Court in
Chevron did not rely on any distinction between specific and general rulemaking delegations as
the basis for the standard enunciated in the decision. See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying
text (discussing Chevron). For a discussion of the validity of the distinction suggested by the
Court in the Rowan case, see infra notes 105-12 and accompanying text (arguing that no valid
basis exists for according more deference to regulations issued under specific rulemaking
authority).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1982). The challenged regulation, which implemented provisions of
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, permitted states (charged with administering the
Clean Air Act provisions) "to adopt a plantwide definition of the term 'stationary source.'"
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840. The issue in Chevron involved whether the agency's decision "to
allow States to treat all of the pollution-emitting devices within the same industrial grouping as
though they were encased within a single 'bubble'" was based on a permissible construction of
that statutory term. Id.
70. The EPA issued the regulation pursuant to the authority granted by Section 301(a) of
the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(1) (1982)). See 46 Fed. Reg. 16,282 (1981) (citing
Section 301(a) as authority for proposed regulation). Section 301(a) provides that "[t]he Ad-
ministrator is authorized to prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out his func-
tions under [the Act]."
71. The court of appeals found that neither the statutory language nor the legislative his-
tory of the Act "squarely addressed" the precise question at issue. NRDC v. Gorsuch, 685
F.2d 718, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (quoted in Chevron, 467 U.S. at 841). The court based its
decision to invalidate the regulation on its understanding of the main purpose of the federal
program: to improve air quality. 685 F.2d at 726 & n.39 (cited in 467 U.S. at 841).
72. 467 U.S. at 865.
73. Id. at 844. The Court's emphasis on the construction having been put forth by the
agency entrusted to administer the statutory scheme raises the question of whether the Chev-
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the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress."74 On the other hand, if Congress has not directly addressed the
issue, "the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute,
as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.""
Instead, "the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based
on a permissible construction of the statute.
76
At one point, the Chevron Court invoked the Batterton line of cases in
support of its standard of judicial deference. 7" The Court could have ex-
tended the rulemaking gap approach under Batterton to general rulemaking
delegations. Using this approach, the deferential Batterton standard, essen-
ron test applies in other interpretative contexts. See supra note 38 (discussing the scope of the
Chevron test).
74. 467 U.S. at 842-43.
75. Id. at 843.
76. Id. Consistent with this standard, the Court emphasized that "[t]he basic legal error of
the Court of Appeals was to adopt a static judicial definition of the term 'stationary source'
when it had decided that Congress itself had not commanded that definition." Id. at 842.
77. The reference to the Batterton standard was made in the following passage (perhaps
the most oft-quoted portion of the Chevron Court's opinion):
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delega-
tion of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative
delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In
such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision
for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.
Id. at 843-44 (footnotes omitted). This passage, by its juxtaposition of explicit and implicit
rulemaking gaps, might be read as endorsing the two-track standard for reviewing agency
constructions, under which legislative effect is given to a regulation issued pursuant to a spe-
cific rulemaking delegation without an exacting search for legislative meaning. See generally
Saunders, supra note 35, at 356 (arguing that the "significance of an implicit or explicit gap in
a statute was central to the Court's opinion"). On the other hand, the Court's assertion that
the judiciary must "always" ask whether Congress has "directly spoken to the precise question
at issue" suggests that a court must conduct an active search for legislative meaning, notwith-
standing the presence of a specific rulemaking delegation. 467 U.S. at 842. Thus, despite the
dictum concerning explicit and implicit rulemaking gaps, Chevron can be read as providing for
enforcement of specific legislative meaning without regard to the nature of the rulemaking
grant under which a challenged regulation is promulgated. See Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub.
Welfare v. United States Dep't of Health and Human Serv., Medicare & Medicaid Guide
(CCH) 1 37,544 at 18,868 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 1988) (holding that the question of whether an
agency promulgated a regulation under specific or general authorization is relevant only where
"the intent of Congress is not clear"); Anthony, supra note 38, at 126 (commenting that Chev-
ron "sets up a three-stage analysis" under which an inquiry into whether there is a "specific
congressional intent" precedes consideration of whether the delegation of rulemaking authority
is explicit or implicit).
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tially, step two of the Chevron analysis, 78 would apply anytime an agency has
appropriately exercised delegated rulemaking power. Clearly, the Court did
not adopt this approach; at no point did the Court examine whether the
EPA's regulation involved a proper exercise of its general rulemaking au-
thority.79 Chevron makes unmistakably clear that a general rulemaking del-
egation does not connote an interpretative intent to accord legislative effect
to an agency rule issued pursuant to the delegation.80
In place of the rulemaking gap analysis advanced in Batterton, Chevron
substitutes a statutory gap analysis under which the zone of deference to an
agency's construction is determined by an assessment of legislative meaning.
The extent to which Chevron permits a court to pry legislative meaning from
a statutory enactment when assessing the validity of an agency's construc-
tion has been the subject of considerable debate.81 A plausible argument can
be made that Chevron severely restricts the court, allowing it to enforce only
the most facially evident legislative meaning. Thus, the presence of any am-
78. Step two of Chevron requires only that the agency's construction be "reasonable." 467
U.S. at 844. This was essentially the standard applied in Batterton. See supra note 47 and
accompanying text (describing the Batterton decision).
79. In contrast to its approach in Batterton, the Court did not give legislative effect to the
EPA's regulation merely on the ground that the agency issued the regulation under a statutory
grant of rulemaking authority. Cf. Saunders, supra note 35, at 357 (interpreting Chevron as
according "legislative effect" to an agency regulation on the basis of legislative meaning). Nor
did the Court attempt to distinguish the Batterton standard on the ground that the regulation
in Chevron had been promulgated under general, rather than specific, rulemaking authority.
80. Another explanation for this aspect of Chevron is that the general rulemaking delega-
tion in question did not authorize the promulgation of a substantive or legislative rule. Cf K.
DAVIS, supra note 30, § 7:8, at 172-75 (using this explanation to fit Supreme Court case law
into a "theory" that legislative rules must be accorded legislative effect). The rulemaking dele-
gation involved in Chevron is, however, virtually identical to the type of delegation that has
been held to confer substantive rulemaking power. See supra note 27 and accompanying text
(discussing general rule). As Professor Davis has observed, "[a] typical statute which provides
in broad terms that an agency has authority to issue regulations to carry out the statute should
be interpreted to mean that the agency may issue legislative rules, not merely interpretative
rules." K. DAVIS, supra note 30, § 7:8, at 175 (Supp. 1982). Chevron neither disputes nor
endorses that view but adopts a standard under which the point is irrelevant.
81. Compare Farina, supra note 5, at 460 (describing Chevron as excluding from the
search for legislative intent "any judicial attempt to translate imperfect legislative expression,
extrapolate answers from related statutory provisions or infer congressionally preferred solu-
tions from the statute's animating principles") with Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron
Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 299 (1986) (deference required whenever statutory ambiguity
exists with respect to the precise question before the court, at least where the statutory scheme
is technical or complex and the agency interpreting the statute has some expertise in the area)
and Saunders, supra note 35, at 360 (arguing that "the type of ambiguity or silence" in a
statute determines whether deference is accorded agency construction under Chevron); see also
Note, Coring the Seedless Grape: A Reinterpretation of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 986, 995-99 (1987) (reading Chevron to require examination of "[d]eference
factors" even where statutory language is facially ambiguous).
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biguity in a statutory enactment would require deference to any one of the
reasonable alternative meanings selected by the agency. Under this reading
of Chevron, a court's inquiry into legislative meaning would be as deferential
as the inquiry under the Batterton standard, which itself requires a court to
invalidate an agency rule that is "manifestly contrary" to the governing stat-
ute.82 Although applied under a different rubric, the Chevron test, as so
read, would give legislative effect to any reasonable construction of a statu-
tory provision.
While this interpretation of Chevron finds support in some of the Court's
dicta, 3 there are strong indications that the Court did not intend to relegate
legislative meaning to the black hole of agency discretion. The Court em-
phasized repeatedly that the deference accorded to an agency's construction
under step two of the Chevron analysis applied only if a specific legislative
meaning could not be derived from the congressional enactment. The Court
also asserted that the judiciary has the final say on matters of statutory con-
struction "and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary
to clear congressional intent."" a Indeed, the Court engaged in a searching
examination of statutory language and legislative history before concluding
that Congress had delegated "policymaking responsibilities" to the agency.85
In a key footnote, the Court stated: "If a court, employing traditional tools
of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the
precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given
effect.
86
This passage, in particular, points to a considerably different reading of
Chevron. Chevron precludes a court from imposing its own construction on
a statute once the court determines that Congress did not express a specific
82. See 467 U.S. at 844 (reciting Batterton standard).
83. The Court states that a reviewing court must give effect to the "unambiguously ex-
pressed intent of Congress" and concludes that "if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based
on a permissible construction of the statute." Id. at 843. Such dicta (fairly read), however,
merely advance the conclusion that where a statute is ambiguous, Le., specific legislative mean-
ing cannot be derived from a statutory enactment, a reviewing court generally should defer to
the agency construction. The decision does not list the steps a court should take before con-
cluding that the statute is ambiguous.
84. Id. at 843 n.9.
85. Id. at 865 (emphasis added). As one commentator has remarked, "the degree to
which the ambiguity present in the statute reflects uncertainty about which of two competing
policies is to carry the day" plays "a major role" in the Chevron analysis. Saunders, supra note
35, at 360. "When Congress is motivated by competing policy concerns in enacting a statute,
it is more likely implicitly to delegate authority to interpret the statute and thereby balance the
policies than when only one policy dominates and the question is simply how the policy under-
lying the statute applies to the issue at hand." Id. (footnote omitted).
86. 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 (emphasis added).
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intent on the matter at issue. The court, however, using the traditional tools
of statutory construction and without deferring to the agency, makes that
initial determination of whether Congress has spoken on the issue.17 Ac-
cordingly, the mere presence of ambiguity does not invariably require defer-
ence to the agency because, in many circumstances, Congress may have
reached a specific intent and failed to convey that intent with pristine clarity.
The Chevron Court did not defer to the EPA's construction of the statute
solely because the statute contained an ambiguity as to the meaning of the
term "stationary source," but because the ambiguity betrayed a failure on
the part of Congress to resolve the competing policy interests at the "level of
specificity" required to preclude the EPA from applying its view of the ap-
propriate accommodation of those interests.8 Because the Court could not
coax a discernible legislative meaning from the statutory language, context,
or legislative history, it deferred to the meaning assigned by the agency. 9
In this regard, Chevron strongly echoes the judicial model of implied law-
making delegation advanced by Professor Dickerson, under which courts
recognize lawmaking authority only after an exhaustive search of the rele-
vant legislative sources fails to yield a discernible legislative meaning. 90
Under this lawmaking gap approach, translated to the administrative con-
text, the judiciary has the final say on legislative meaning (step one of Chev-
ron). The agency, however, given its superior capacity to "resolve
competing political interests," becomes the primary player once the focus
shifts from ascertaining meaning to assigning it (step two of Chevron).91 In
87. The view that a reviewing court carries out step one of Chevron, without deference to
the agency's construction, using tools of statutory construction to ferret out legislative mean-
ing, has been consistently asserted by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, the lead court in the application of Chevron. A recent example of that
court's synthesis of Chevron and its progeny is found in Ohio v. United States Dep't of the
Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
88. 467 U.S. at 859, 865.
89. Id. at 865.
90. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text (summarizing Professor Dickerson's
model). Both the Dickerson model and Chevron (properly read) require that a court employ
traditional tools of statutory construction to ascertain legislative meaning. Both contemplate,
albeit to varying degrees, the recognition of a lawmaking delegation even when one reading of
a statute appears to the court to be more natural than another. Compare R. DICKERSON, supra
note 13, at 27 (a court must enforce any legislative meaning that can be ascertained "with
reasonable confidence") with Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 (court to give effect to legislative mean-
ing where "the intent of Congress is clear").
91. 467 U.S. at 865. In an article written prior to Chevron, Professor Henry Monaghan
asserted that "distinctions between 'construction' and 'application' have never been employed
to measure what law-declaring authority Congress can confer upon an administrative agency,"
noting that the "substantive rule-making cases [Batterton, et al.] make that plain." Monaghan,
Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 29-30 (1983). To the extent that
Chevron adopts such a distinction under its two-step format, the case can be viewed as ex-
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some circumstances, facial ambiguity or the lack of a discernible legislative
meaning in a statutory enactment may indicate that Congress has not "di-
rectly spoken to the precise question at issue." 92 Therefore, the facial ambi-
guity will result in a grant of lawmaking authority to the agency. In other
circumstances, facial ambiguity will not result in a lawmaking delegation to
the agency and will preclude the judiciary from according deference to the
agency's implementation of the statute.
If the Court's adoption of a lawmaking gap approach in Chevron was not
unequivocal, subsequent cases strongly confirm that Chevron can provide for
substantial enforcement of legislative meaning in the administrative context.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in
particular, has invoked Chevron on several occasions to invalidate an agency
construction as being inconsistent with a legislative intent ascertained by the
court, despite the presence of facial ambiguity in the statutory enactment.
93
The Supreme Court has also subjected agency interpretations to exacting
scrutiny under the Chevron standard.94 In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,95 the
Court, per Justice Stevens, the author of the Chevron opinion, reaffirmed
that if, in "[e]mploying traditional tools of statutory construction," a court
concludes that Congress reached an intent that conflicts with an agency's
construction, the Chevron standard requires that the court invalidate that
construction.96 While it is not generally the province of the judiciary "to set
forth a detailed description" of how to apply a statutory term, Chevron re-
panding the policing authority of the judiciary in reviewing agency action. But see Farina,
supra note 5, at 453-55 (arguing that Chevron ends the "judicial vacillation" between the "in.
dependent judgment model" and the "deference model" in favor of the latter).
92. 467 U.S. at 842.
93. See Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 441-59 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(invalidating agency construction of imprecise statutory language); Georgetown Univ. Hosp.
v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 323, 326-30 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (reading general statutory term in context of
overall statutory scheme to invalidate agency construction); Washington Hosp. Center v.
Bowen, 795 F.2d 139, 144-48 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (relying on rule of statutory construction to
invalidate agency interpretation); see also Bethesda Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 485 U.S. 399, 403-
08 (1988) (rejecting agency construction of vague statutory language despite previous approval
by several lower courts).
94. The Court has made it clear that the meaning of general statutory language can be
ascertained from legislative history and statutory context. See NLRB v. United Food & Com-
mercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 123-24 (1987) (examining "words, structure, and his-
tory" of subject Act to determine whether agency regulations were "fully consistent" with
congressional intent); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 427-43 (1987) (probing statutory
context and legislative history to arrive at legislative meaning).
95. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
96. Id. at 446-49.
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quires that a court strike down an agency interpretation that "Congress did
not intend.",
97
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia accused the majority of having
eviscerated the Chevron standard. Specifically, he argued that the majority
was wrong to suggest "that courts may substitute their interpretation of a
statute for that of an agency whenever, '[e]mploying traditional tools of stat-
utory construction,' they are able to reach a conclusion as to the proper
interpretation of a statute."9 According to Justice Scalia, "this approach
would make deference a doctrine of desperation, authorizing courts to defer
only if they would otherwise be unable to construe the enactment at issue." 99
Justice Scalia overstates his case. Even under the most expansive lawmak-
ing gap approach, a substantial component of an agency's implementation of
a statutory provision lies beyond intensive judicial scrutiny."c° Further,
Cardoza-Fonseca certainly does not hold that a reviewing court is free to
disregard an agency's construction anytime the court would have construed
the statute differently. Nonetheless, Cardoza-Fonseca does reaffirm the re-
sponsibility of a reviewing court to resort fully to the tools of statutory con-
struction, including legislative history and the basic canons of statutory
construction,' 1° to ascertain whether Congress has shown an intent on the
"precise question at issue." Courts will defer to an agency's construction of
a statutory scheme only after a careful appraisal of the agency's lawmaking
authority, based on the courts' close scrutiny of the language, context, and
legislative history of the statute.102
97. Id. at 446-48. The Court did acknowledge the existence of "some ambiguity" in the
statutory term at issue. Id The Court recognized, however, that while its role was not to
specify everything that the term must mean, its responsibility included drawing the boundaries
of permissible legislative meaning and rejecting any agency construction that crossed the line.
In this regard, the Court's analysis strongly echoes the "empowering arrangement" suggested
by Professor Monaghan. See infra note 106 and accompanying text (quoting Monaghan in
arguing that a reviewing court's responsibilities should be no different when an agency promul-
gates a rule pursuant to a specific rulemaking delegation).
98. 480 U.S. at 454 (Scalia, J., concurring).
99. Id.
100. The creative role in the "interpretative" process, assumed by courts in the absence of
an agency construction, is fully within the purview of the agency's reasonable exercise of its
implementing authority. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text (describing application
of lawmaking gap approach under Chevron).
101. See 480 U.S. at 432 (invoking a canon of construction .stating that where "'Congress
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the
same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the dispa-
rate inclusion or exclusion' ") (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).
102. See generally Survey, Leading Cases of the 1986 Term, 101 HARV. L. REV. 87, 349-50
(1987) (noting that Cardoza-Fonseca "serves as a reminder that searching judicial inquiries
into congressional intent in the administrative law context are not obsolete").
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II. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT AND THE RULEMAKING GAP APPROACH:
THE SEARCH FOR LEGISLATIVE MEANING IN
A RULEMAKING WORLD
Notwithstanding Chevron's use of legislative meaning to define statutory
gaps of agency lawmaking discretion, the Court still clings to the view that
agency regulations issued pursuant to a specific rulemaking delegation are
entitled to legislative effect.1"3 Thus, with respect to specific rulemaking
delegations, the Court holds the reviewing court to the Batterton and not the
Chevron standard. In effect, the crucial first step of Chevron is bypassed, and
a court reviews the agency's construction without careful consideration of
specific legislative meaning. Again, this raises the question: Is there justifi-
cation for applying a more deferential standard for reviewing agency con-
structions solely because of the specific nature of a rulemaking delegation?
The Court has not specifically attempted to reconcile its recognition of
lawmaking gaps in the administrative context with its continued adherence
to the Batterton standard.1" As suggested above, however, the bases for
such a distinction appear to be twofold: (1) by specifically directing or au-
thorizing an agency to exercise rulemaking powers, Congress signals its in-
terpretive intent that the product of the agency's rulemaking be given
legislative effect; and (2) standards prescribed pursuant to a specific
rulemaking delegation are legislative rules and, thus, are entitled to such
effect.
The argument that Congress intended for courts to defer to any agency
regulation issued under a specific rulemaking delegation sets up an apparent
battle between competing indicia of congressional intent. On the one hand,
Congress has enacted a statutory provision that, upon application of tradi-
tional tools of statutory construction, furnishes evidence of a specific legisla-
tive meaning. Yet, Congress has given the agency substantive rulemaking
103. See supra notes 1 and 62 and accompanying text (citing to cases, including post-Chev-
ron cases, that have favorably invoked the Batterton standard).
104. Chevron itself might be read to affirm Batterton by its juxtaposition of explicit and
implicit statutory gaps. As noted previously, however, the Court's dictum read in context
could be interpreted to require the search for legislative meaning without regard to the manner
in which Congress delegated rulemaking authority. See supra note 77 (discussing juxtaposi-
tion). In a recent case, Sullivan v. Zebley, 110 S. Ct. 885 (1990), the majority of the Court
cited the more deferential explicit gap standard invoked in Chevron to invalidate agency regu-
lations promulgated under a specific rulemaking delegation. Id. at 890. The majority was not
required to consider whether a more exacting search for legislative meaning would have been
appropriate in the event the regulations passed muster under the explicit gap standard. Signifi-
cantly, in a dissenting opinion, Justice White specifically observed that "[a]s this case involves
a challenge to an agency's interpretation of a statute that the agency was entrusted to adminis-
ter, [the two-step Chevron analysis] provides the framework for our review." Id at 897
(White, J., dissenting).
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authority to prescribe legislative standards that implement a specific statu-
tory provision. Which of these conflicting legislative signposts should courts
follow?
The answer is that these respective indicia of congressional intent in no
way conflict. By specifically delegating rulemaking authority, Congress has
indicated that the agency is to act in a legislative capacity in implementing a
statutory provision. Presumably, this means that some lawmaking gap has
been left for the agency to fill, and the court's role is to determine the point
at which deference to the agency's decisionmaking begins.' 5 This is typi-
cally the case in the administrative context. As Professor Monaghan has
observed:
The court's task is to fix the boundaries of delegated authority, an
inquiry that includes defining the range of permissible criteria. In
such an empowering arrangement, responsibility for meaning is
shared between court and agency; the judicial role is to specify
what the statute cannot mean, and some of what it must mean, but
not all that it does mean. 10
Agencies are often legislative partners with Congress in the development
of statutory policy. Agencies, however, are decidedly junior partners. In
some circumstances, Congress may leave no room for agency lawmaking.'0 7
In others, Congress might grant broad lawmaking responsibility, providing
no specific constraints on the agency's implementation of a statutory
scheme.' 8 In the balance of cases, Congress leaves some gap for agency
participation but narrows that gap by evincing a specific legislative meaning
or meanings through its enactment of a statutory provision. The rulemaking
gap approach does not take into account this third category of congressional
and agency interaction. Therefore, the rulemaking gap approach permits
105. But see infra note 107 (arguing that the presence of a specific rulemaking delegation
should not deter a court in an appropriate case from denying any lawmaking role to the
agency).
106. Monaghan, supra note 91, at 27.
107. One might assume that a specific rulemaking delegation would at least preclude a
finding that there has been no lawmaking delegation to the agency on a particular point. Even
where there is no implicit delegation of lawmaking authority to an agency, however, it is not
inconceivable that Congress would prefer the agency to map out the statutory scheme by regu-
lation. Further, as discussed below, the use of specific rulemaking delegations is almost a
reflex action among some legislative draftsmen and, thus, lacks probative force as a determi-
nant of congressional intent. See infra notes 121-22 and accompanying text. If there is strong
evidence of a legislative meaning that preempts any lawmaking role for the agency, the pres-
ence of a specific rulemaking delegation should not deter the court from giving effect to that
meaning.
108. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(dX5XC)(iii) (1988) (authorizing the Secretary of Health
and Human Services to "provide by regulation for such other exceptions and adjustments to
[the Medicare Prospective Payment System] as the Secretary deems appropriate").
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recalcitrant agencies, bent on carrying out the political agenda of the execu-
tive branch rather than the expressed will of Congress, to ignore congres-
sional intent in a broad range of circumstances.
The full import of the rulemaking gap approach-and the extent of its
dubious premises-is made starkly apparent by the Court's analysis in Bat-
terton.'19 In Batterton, the Court refused to ascribe a specific meaning to the
term "unemployment" as used by Congress in defining eligibility under the
AFDC program. The Court distinguished a previous decision, Nierotko, in
which it had gleaned a specific meaning from the term "wages" as used in
defining eligibility under another federal social program. 1 Under the
Court's analysis, the basis for the distinction was that Congress, in enacting
the AFDC statute, had specifically directed the agency to prescribe stan-
dards to define the statutory term. 1 Purportedly, the intent expressed by
Congress through the legislative meaning underlying the respective enact-
ments was not the relevant consideration.
In neither Batterton nor Nierotko would it have been appropriate for the
Court to tell the agency precisely what the statutory term must mean. The
Court did, however, have the responsibility to tell the agency what the term
"cannot mean, and some of what it must mean,"'1 2 if the Court ascertained
legislative meaning from the statutory enactment. Surely, it is fiction of the
highest order to hold that Congress intends for this fundamental role of the
judiciary to be held hostage by the manner in which Congress delegates
rulemaking to the agency.
109. See generally supra notes 41-61 and accompanying text (discussing the Batterton
decision).
110. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
111. Professor Davis asserts in the 1979 edition of his treatise that the "key" to the Court's
analysis in Batterton was that Congress had delegated rulemaking authority to the agency-
not that the delegation was specific rather than general. 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 1, § 7:8, at 41.
Thus, Professor Davis attempts to draw from Batterton a more general endorsement of defer-
ence to all rules promulgated under rulemaking authority. K. DAVIS, supra note 30, § 7:8, at
172 (Supp. 1982). The Batterton Court did emphasize, however, that Congress had "ex-
pressly" conferred the delegation at issue on the agency. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416,
425 (1977). Further, in Nierotko, the agency had general rulemaking authority; the Court's
emphasis in Nierotko, as in Batterton, was on the lack of specific rulemaking authority. Social
Sec. Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369 (1946) (emphasizing that Congress did not specifically
delegate the authority to define the statutory term). See also supra note 50 (discussing agency
rulemaking authority in Nierotko). In any event, in subsequent Supreme Court cases, use of
the Batterton standard has been confined to specific rulemaking delegations. See supra notes
62-66 and accompanying text (discussing post-Batterton case law).
112. Monaghan, supra note 91, at 27.
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To be certain, the tools of statutory construction that courts use to ascer-
tain legislative meaning are also replete with fictions. 1 3 Thus, a central fea-
ture of the interpretative function should be to fix the point at which the
application of these fictions becomes too mired in uncertainty for a control-
ling legislative meaning to emerge with sufficient clarity." 4 While a specific
meaning will at times be clear on the face of a statute, a clearly expressed
meaning can also be derived from statutory context, the relevant legislative
history (despite the views of Justice Scalia and a minority of other judges
and commentators), and by application of the canons of statutory construc-
tion. 11 5 Chevron permits, and indeed requires, courts to search out, identify,
and enforce such meaning, notwithstanding an administrative construction
to the contrary.
In contrast, Batterton's rulemaking gap approach limits courts to invali-
dating only the most egregious deviations from contrary legislative intent.
The Batterton approach allows for no meaningful resort to statutory context
or canons of construction in passing upon the validity of an agency's con-
struction. Taken to an extreme, that standard might preclude reliance on
even the most clearly enunciated and probative legislative history.
1 16
113. As Professor Dickerson notes, while the rules of statutory construction provide the
"best working approximation" of actual intent, "no method has yet been devised by which
[actual intent] can be directly known." R. DICKERSON, supra note 13, at 36, 85.
114. Even many proponents of judicial lawmaking authority concede that courts should
exercise lawmaking only at the point where a court cannot discern specific intent from the
statutory enactment. See, e.g., Luneburg, supra note 7, at 758 (noting that while "lawmaking
may form a significant element in statutory interpretation," there "is such a thing as the intent
of the enacting legislature" and that "courts should pay due deference to it on the basis of
accepted separation of powers notions").
115. Justice Scalia is at the forefront of a vocal minority of conservative judges and schol-
ars who have been highly critical of what they perceive as excessive reliance on legislative
history in statutory interpretation. These advocates of strict adherence to statutory language
argue that legislative history is unreliable, and that such reliance contravenes constitutionally
prescribed procedures for lawmaking and permits judges to override the political bargains
struck in a statutory enactment. See generally Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 28-31 (summariz-
ing the views of Justice Scalia and other advocates of "the new plain meaning"). While these
views have been thoroughly aired in academic circles, they have yet to carry the day in the
courts.
116. If a court construed a specific delegation of rulemaking authority as clear evidence of
congressional intent not to restrict an agency to any specific legislative meaning, then even the
most clearly expressed contrary intent in the legislative history could only be given effect if a
court were willing to use legislative history to override the "plain meaning" of the statute.
Whether it is permissible to affix such weight to legislative history is a disputed point. Com-
pare INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 n. 12 (1987) (majority opinion) (stating that a
court may "look to the legislative history to determine ... whether there is 'clearly expressed
legislative intention' contrary to that language, which would require [the Court] to question
the strong presumption that Congress expresses its intent through the language it chooses")
with id. at 452 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing the "venerable principle that if the language of
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Whatever the intent behind a congressional choice to prescribe specific
rulemaking authority, it seems farfetched in the least that Congress by such
choice intended, in direct contravention of the traditional "empowering ar-
rangement" between Congress and agencies, 1 7 to strip a reviewing court of
any meaningful authority to enforce legislative meaning in an administrative
context.
Indeed, Batterton's assertion that a specific rulemaking delegation is in-
tended to connote extreme deference to agency authority ignores a more
plausible explanation as to why legislative draftsmen may elect to make a
rulemaking delegation specific. As a general rule, agencies are given broad
discretion over the manner in which they proceed to implement statutory
provisions. 1 8 In the absence of a specific direction in the enabling statute,
or in the individual enactments that amend that statute, agencies are free to
choose between rulemaking and adjudication as the primary or exclusive
means of implementing their governing statutes.' 9 In some cases, however,
Congress may not want an agency to bury implementation in informal case-
by-case adjudication, wherein affected parties may have difficulty identifying
the governing standards, and the risk of arbitrary or inequitable application
of the agency's construction is substantial. Accordingly, Congress may
make a specific rulemaking delegation to indicate its preference that the
agency follow rulemaking procedures in implementing a statutory provi-
the statute is clear, that language must be given effect"); see also Matter of Sinclair, 870 F.2d
1340, 1341-44 (7th Cir. 1989) (concluding that legislative history can be used to "show the
meaning" of the text but cannot be used to "trump the text").
117. Monaghan, supra note 91, at 27. While there is a legal tradition of deference to
agency action, the view that courts must enforce legislative meaning, regardless of the nature
of the agency's delegated power, also carries substantial historical support. For example, in a
well-known case decided prior to enactment of the APA, Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prod-
ucts, Inc., 322 U.S. 607 (1944), the Court confronted a specific rulemaking delegation similar
to that in Batterton. Id. at 608 (statutory provision exempted employees "'within the area of
production (as defined by the Administrator)' "). Although noting that "Congress gave the
Administrator appropriate discretion to assess all the factors relevant to the subject matter,"
the Court invalidated the Administrator's regulation based upon "[c]ongressional purpose as
manifested by text and context," as well as the "[m]eagre legislative history." Id. at 614-15.
According to the Court, "[t]he details with which the exemptions in this Act have been made
preclude their enlargement by implication," notwithstanding the Administrator's delegated
authority. Id. at 618.
118. See generally FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143 (1940) (noting
that agencies "should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure and to pursue methods of
inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their multitudinous duties") (footnote omit-
ted) (quoted in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978)).
119. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (emphasizing that "the
choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that
lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency").
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sion.' 2 ° Ironically, under the Batterton standard, this attempt to control
agency decisionmaking is read conversely as having effected broad deference
to the product of the agency's action.
Further, the principal assumption underlying the Batterton standard, that
there is a reasonably coherent pattern of use or nonuse of specific delegations
reflecting circumstances where Congress intends to effect extreme deference
and where it does not, fails to comport with legislative realities. The use of
phrases like "as determined under standards prescribed by the Secretary"
reflects the prevailing assumption among congressional staff that Congress
should steer away from micromanaging every detail of a federal program.
Nevertheless, an enormous leap of logic is required to suggest that this lan-
guage alone is meant to free the agency to pursue its own policy agenda
without careful judicial oversight.' 21 The use or nonuse of specific delega-
tions is haphazard, involving an incalculable number of separate drafting
choices made without any reasonable reference point.122 Under any reason-
able standard of statutory construction, reliance on such a hollow fiction
cannot be supported. The Batterton line of cases purports to adopt deference
to congressional intent in the operation of statutory provisions subject to
agency construction. In reality, by potentially ignoring the most plausible
indicia of congressional intent reflected in the statutory enactment, these
cases strike an activist blow in favor of agency usurpation of the lawmaking
function.
If the Batterton rulemaking gap approach cannot be sustained on the basis
of congressional intent, then all that remains to support the approach is the
wooden application of the legislative-interpretative rule distinction. The
problem with this justification is twofold. First, a regulation issued pursuant
to a general rulemaking delegation has as much claim to legislative rule sta-
tus as one issued under a specific delegation.' 23 In Chevron, the agency regu-
120. See infra notes 131-47 and accompanying text (discussing how legislative draftsmen
may use specific rulemaking delegations to control agency decisionmaking).
121. It is this author's opinion, based on his experience as an attorney in the Senate Legis-
lative Counsel's office in drafting federal legislation, that congressional staff, professional and
political, do not understand using a specific rulemaking delegation to give heightened defer-
ence to agency action. At most, the phrase is used reflexively, if erratically, to express the
agency discretion that is inherent in the congressional-agency lawmaking partnership.
122. A specific rulemaking delegation may be used when there is basic agreement on the
meaning of a statutory term. Conversely, because of either circumstance or the preferences of
the draftsman no specific delegation may be used when there is little, if any, consensus on
specific issues. If a tool of statutory construction yields a clear legislative meaning, that mean-
ing should not be held hostage by the congressional "decision" to interpose specific rulemaking
authority.
123. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL
AGENCY RULEMAKING 36 (1983) (noting that "it is now accepted that agencies can adopt
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lation under review had been promulgated under general rulemaking
authority.124 Nevertheless, Chevron required the use of lawmaking gaps to
define the area of deference to agency decisionmaking. If Chevron requires
this in the context of general delegations, the same requirement should per-
tain to specific delegations.
More fundamentally, the distinction between legislative and interpretative
rules is not grounded in any coherent policy related to the appropriate im-
plementation of statutory provisions by administrative agencies.125 The dis-
tinction is reflected in the Administrative Procedure Act's notice and
comment provision, but nothing in the APA provides that this distinction
should profoundly affect the standard for reviewing an agency rule. 126
There are strong indications that the distinction has not played a significant
role, since the enactment of the APA, in shaping the intensity of judicial
review of agency decisionmaking. 127 Chevron and its progeny firmly estab-
legislative rules under general rulemaking delegations"); see K. DAVIS, supra note 30, § 7:8, at
175 (Supp. 1982) (asserting that "[a] typical statute which provides in broad terms that an
agency has authority to issue regulations to carry out the statute should be interpreted to mean
that the agency may issue legislative rules, not merely interpretative rules").
124. See supra note 70 (discussing statutory authority for regulation at issue in Chevron).
125. In one recent case, Midtec Paper Corp. v. United States, 857 F.2d 1487 (D.C. Cir.
1988), the court rejected the argument that an agency interpretation is entitled to less defer-
ence when it is invoked in an adjudicative proceeding rather than adopted through rulemak-
ing. According to the Court:
Our inquiry is the same in each procedural context. We first examine the text of the
implicated statute and, where appropriate, its legislative history; using the traditional
tools of statutory construction, we seek to determine whether and how Congress
resolved the specific issues of law raised in the proceeding under review, and confine
the agency to consistency with Congress's intent.
Id at 1496. If there is no basis for distinguishing between interpretations reached through
adjudication and rulemaking, then it is difficult to see why any distinction should be made
between types of agency rules.
126. Professor Davis argues that the legislative history of the APA evidences an intent to
give substantially more deference to legislative rules. 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 1, § 7:9, at 43-50.
His analysis, however, begs the question of what is meant by "legislative rule." While there
has been much confusion surrounding the legislative-interpretative rule distinction, an impor-
tant component of the distinction has traditionally centered on the content of the rule, not on
whether the rule was issued under statutory rulemaking authority. See Saunders, supra note
35, at 349, 352-53 (citing the Attorney General's Manual on the APA and noting that Bat-
terton blurred this distinction by according legislative effect to an agency interpretation merely
because the agency issued the rule under rulemaking authority). "Thus, while legislative rules
grant new rights and impose new obligations, interpretative rules merely explain the rights and
obligations already created, albeit in masked form, by the statute." Id. at 350 (footnote omit-
ted). Under this view, a court could not accord legislative rule status to any rule that involves
a substantial interpretative component, including many rules issued under a rulemaking dele-
gation and most rules where there is controversy over legislative meaning.
127. See Asimov, Public Participation in the Adoption of Interpretive Rules and Policy State-
ments; 75 MICH. L. REV. 521, 563-65 (1977) (arguing that judicial scrutiny of legislative rules
has become far more exacting in recent years, while review of interpretative rules is less intense
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lish that it is the judiciary's responsibility to enforce strict adherence to dis-
cernible legislative meaning in the application of statutory provisions. The
manner in which an agency construction is authorized and carried out
should not significantly alter this fundamental role.
In this regard, Chevron, often attacked for having "sold the farm" to ad-
ministrative agencies, may in 'fact have restored legislative meaning as the
controlling force in determining the allocation of lawmaking power among
the three branches. Undoubtedly, Chevron rejected the view that courts can
project their own understanding of Congress' policy preferences onto a stat-
utory scheme once the courts determine that lawmaking authority has been
effectively delegated to the agency. Arguably, this is justifiable reconciliation
of separation of powers concerns. 28  On the other hand, the case clearly
holds that within the legitimate domain of statutory interpretation, the judi-
ciary is supreme and must exercise its power of review with vigilance to
ensure that legislative meaning is given full effect in agency decisionmak-
ing. 2 Under this view, legislative supremacy is preserved in the adminis-
than commonly believed). With the exception of the specific rulemaking delegation cases, the
distinction is typically invoked only when there is an argument made that an agency was
required to follow notice and comment procedures under the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)
(1988). In such cases, courts can reach the merits of the rule only if the rule is classified as
interpretative, assuming notice and comment procedures were not followed. A determination
that the rule is legislative for purposes of the notice and comment requirement results in invali-
dation of the rule on procedural grounds. See, e.g., Arrow Air, Inc. v. Dole, 784 F.2d 1118,
1122-25 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (reviewing validity of rule characterized as interpretative for pur-
poses of notice and comment requirement); General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d
1561, 1564-67 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (same), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1074 (1985).
128. Compare Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the
Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
1093, 1118-22 (1987) (deferring to agencies is favorable because it promotes uniform applica-
tion of statutory policy) with Survey, supra note 102 at 252-55 (Chevron deference permits
agencies to pursue the executive's political agenda even though inconsistent with basic purpose
of statute).
129. The purpose of this Article is not to offer a "revisionist" view of Chevron, nor is
adoption of such a view necessary to make the Article's central point. Whatever the level of
scrutiny permitted under Chevron, that level is surely more exacting than the cursory examina-
tion of agency action permitted under the Batterton standard. See infra note 130 (contrasting
lower court invalidation rates under Chevron and Batterton). Nonetheless, the uproar in some
quarters over Chevron's implications seems, in this author's judgment, to be misplaced. Chev-
ron is well-grounded in the tradition of deference to agency authority within the clearly pre-
scribed statutory limits. Properly applied, Chevron permits a court, in defining the limits of
agency authority, to extract legislative meaning from facially ambiguous provisions. (Such
applications are found in the decisions of Chief Judge Wald for the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit). If Chevron effected any change to the established order, it was
in erecting a specific framework for review which makes it difficult for an activist court to
substitute its views on wise public policy, based loosely on statutory purpose, for those prof-
fered by the agency charged with administering the statutory program in question. While
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trative context using the same general framework as it is, or should be,
where no agency construction precedes judicial action.
III. DRAFrING AROUND THE EXPRESS DELEGATION RULE: THE
LAWMAKERS' DILEMMA
For the legislative draftsman, the above discussion is of academic interest
only; as long as courts continue to invoke the Batterton legislative effect stan-
dard in circumstances where rulemaking is expressly delegated, the danger
persists that a legislative meaning intended by Congress will go unenforced
because of the specific nature of the rulemaking delegation. 3° If this is the
case, then the responsibility for avoiding this unintended result falls to the
draftsman. The question is: What steps can be taken to ensure that legisla-
tive meaning is not inadvertently displaced under the Batterton standard?
One drafting solution is simple: avoid using specific delegations. As indi-
cated above, however, there are alternative reasons why lawmakers may
choose to issue specific rulemaking instructions to agencies. Because of its
desire to control agency decisionmaking, Congress may wish to make clear
that an agency is expected to exercise rulemaking with respect to a specific
statutory provision. One way of accomplishing this is to indicate, as part of
the amendatory language,'13 that the agency is to promulgate standards to
implement the provision. Thus, by inserting the words "as determined
under standards prescribed by the Secretary," or similar language, after a
statutory term in an agency's enabling statute, Congress effectively directs
the agency to exercise rulemaking with respect to that term. 132 Yet, by seek-
adoption of this framework for review is noteworthy, it is hardly as portentous as some com-
mentators have suggested.
130. The notion that Batterton results in more deference to agency action than permitted
under the Chevron framework is supported by the lower courts' application of the two deci-
sions. A 1987 survey of lower court decisions conducted by one student commentator found
that approximately 40 percent of the courts applying Chevron overturned agency regulations.
See Note, supra note 81, at 993. The percentage of cases applying Batterton to overturn agency
regulations does not approach that figure.
131. See supra notes 31-32 (describing the distinction between amendatory and freestand-
ing legislative language).
132. Such language undoubtedly vests the agency with substantive rulemaking authority.
See, e.g., W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE, & P. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 211 (7th ed. 1979)
(noting that the phrase "'as defined by the Administrator'" gives "substantive rulemaking
power" to the agency). The most natural reading of that language requires an agency to exer-
cise rulemaking when implementing the specific statutory provision to which the language
applies. See generally United States v. Markgraf, 736 F.2d 1179, 1185 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding
that an agency had discretion in deciding whether to implement statutory provisions through
rulemaking or adjudication, in part, because the phrase "'under regulations prescribed by the
Secretary,'" contained in the original House version of the Act, was omitted from the final
version passed by Congress).
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ing to make the rulemaking gap explicit in this manner, Congress is held to
have accorded legislative effect to whatever standards the agency fashions.
The dilemma for the draftsman is this: How does Congress exert control
over the manner of agency decisionmaking without signaling substantial def-
erence to the agency's implementation of a statutory provision?
As an initial matter, this drafting dilemma is softened by the practicalities
of agency decisionmaking. While there may be doubt as to whether an
agency is required to exercise rulemaking in a particular circumstance,' 33 an
agency typically will possess general authority to exercise rulemaking pow-
ers, and often will exercise this authority in any situation in which additional
administrative input is anticipated.134 In some cases, the enabling statute
may in fact require an agency to exercise rulemaking where "necessary" to
carry out its responsibility for administering the statutory scheme.1 35 Cer-
tainly, the APA requires notice and comment procedures for any legislative
rule. 136 Depending on the circumstances, an agency that chooses not to im-
plement a statutory provision by appropriate rulemaking procedures faces
the prospect of having its construction invalidated as being improperly
promulgated. This prospect alone provides strong incentive for an agency to
exercise rulemaking in any doubtful circumstance.'
3 7
133. See, e.g., Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 980-82 (1986), rev'g 757
F.2d 354, 357-61 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (finding that a statutory provision that an agency "shall"
promulgate regulations establishing tolerance levels "to such extent as [it] finds necessary for
the protection of the public health" did not require the agency to conduct rulemaking).
134. See ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, A GUIDE TO FED-
ERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 74 (1983) (noting that while only a minority of statutes contain
"forthright instructions to make rules, most regulatory agencies have no difficulty in pointing
to statutory language authorizing them to [promulgate regulations]"). The Administrative
Conference lists the advantages of both rulemaking and adjudication, noting that "[g]enerally
speaking, unless the agency's underlying statute indicates otherwise, the agency should feel
reasonably confident that its choice between rulemaking and adjudication will be respected by
the courts." Id. at 83. It concludes, however, that "[w]here the agency is, in effect, announc-
ing a future policy, we believe it generally is best to use the rulemaking process." Id.
135. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh(a)(l) (1988) (provision of Social Security Act stating
that Secretary of Health and Human Services "shall prescribe such regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the administration of the [Medicare] insurance programs under this
subchapter").
136. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1988).
137. The incentive to adopt rulemaking procedures is particularly strong if agencies are
prevented from employing retroactive rulemaking to correct procedural defects in a previous
agency action. In a case decided under the Medicare Act, Bowen v. Georgetown University
Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988), the Supreme Court struck down an agency's attempt to remedy its
initial failure to follow notice and comment procedures by providing for retroactive application
of a subsequently (and properly) promulgated rule. The majority of the Court, noting that "an
administrative agency's power to promulgate legislative regulations is limited to the authority
delegated by Congress," concluded that "[t]he statutory provisions establishing the [agency's]
general rulemaking power contain no express authorization of retroactive rulemaking." Id. at
[Vol. 39:725
When a Delegation Is Not a Delegation
Still, situations will arise in which an agency does not exercise rulemaking
with respect to its construction of a particular statutory provision. More-
over, in some cases, Congress may want more control than notice and com-
ment rulemaking allows and will want to ensure that congressional control
directives are telescoped to a specific provision in a statutory enactment. 138
Accordingly, the sensitized draftsman should be prepared to consider meth-
ods by which decisionmaking control can be exerted without implicating
Batterton's rulemaking gap approach. There appear to be several
possibilities.
In any case in which legislative meaning is potentially an issue, Congress
can clarify its intended meaning of a statutory amendment. Thus, in the
freestanding language that accompanies a statutory enactment containing a
specific delegation, Congress could indicate that the use of a specific delega-
tion should not be construed to affect the standard of review applicable to
any agency action under the rulemaking delegation. The use of this type of
clarifying provision is not uncommon. 139 In this context, however, the use
of such a provision could raise the implication that where such language is
not employed, Congress did intend for a more deferential standard of review
to apply.14° Because such a clarifying provision contemplates that a specific
delegation could be read as signaling deference to the agency's rulemaking,
its use on a piecemeal basis would further institutionalize the Batterton stan-
dard of review.
208, 213. Justice Scalia went further in his concurrence, arguing that such retroactive
rulemaking was fundamentally inconsistent with the APA, which defines a rule as an" 'agency
statement of general or particular applicability and future effect.'" Id. at 216 (Scalia, J., con-
curring) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1988)). According to Justice Scalia, to permit retroactive
rulemaking in these circumstances would "'make a mockery... of the APA,' since 'agencies
would be free to violate the rulemaking requirements of the APA with impunity if, upon inval-
idation of a rule, they were free to 'reissue' that rule on a retroactive basis.'" Id at 225
(quoting from opinion of lower court).
138. For example, Congress may want to require that final regulations be promulgated
within a specified period of time to ensure that an agency does not deliberately delay imple-
mentation of a statutory provision. Congress might also want to regulate the notice and com-
ment procedure more carefully to ensure that an agency gives adequate consideration to
particular policy proposals.
139. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395g(c) (1988) (setting forth prohibition against direct payment
of Medicare reimbursement to third parties, but stating that "nothing in this subsection shall
be construed" to prohibit two types of payment arrangements).
140. Use of this type of clarifying provision can often lead to unintended results. For ex-
ample, in the case of the statute cited in note 139, supra, the administering agency has con-
strued it to prohibit all but the two types of payment arrangements explicitly placed outside
the reach of the prohibition. See 45 Fed. Reg. 36,701 (1980) (promulgating final regulations
implementing statutory provision). Some of the arrangements subject to the prohibition under
the agency's construction, however, are no more offensive to the statutory prohibition than the
types of arrangements specifically "exempted" under the statute.
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A more desirable approach is for the lawmakers to state affirmatively that
the agency is to employ rulemaking with respect to a particular statutory
amendment without implicating the rulemaking gap approach under Bat-
terton. This can be done either by using freestanding language which re-
quires an agency to issue regulations implementing the amendatory
language,141 or by including within the amendatory language itself a
rulemaking delegation that does not employ the "as determined under. .."
phraseology.142 While each of these approaches expressly effects a rulemak-
ing delegation, neither results in the type of amendatory delegation that sig-
nals deference under the Batterton line of authority.
Admittedly, reliance on freestanding delegations is problematic in that a
rulemaking directive is not usually affixed to any specific provision included
in a statutory amendment; freestanding delegations are typically referenced
to amendments made by particular sections or subsections of the enacted
bill, of which a specific amendatory provision may be but one part.1 43 Thus,
in the absence of amendatory language indicating that an agency is to pro-
mulgate standards with respect to a specific term or provision, a freestanding
delegation would not always ensure that an agency would exercise rulemak-
ing with respect to that term or provision. Nonetheless, while it may be
irregular, it is certainly possible to target freestanding rulemaking directives
to specific amendatory provisions. 1" Indeed, in some circumstances, such
141. The most common freestanding approach is to set forth the delegation in plain terms:
"The Secretary of - shall issue regulations to implement the amendments made by section
- of this Act [the statutory enactment in question]." A freestanding delegation could also be
achieved either by stating that the notice and comment rulemaking provision of the APA
applies to the statutory amendment or by referencing the general rulemaking provisions of the
enabling statute.
142. In lieu of the "as determined under.. . " phrase, the amendatory language can state
that an agency shall or may issue regulations to implement a particular term or subdivision of
the Act in question.
143. Because freestanding language is not included in the amendments made to an underly-
ing Act, the delegation must bridge the gap between the statutory enactment and the pertinent
amendatory provisions. This is typically done by referencing the delegation to amendments
made by particular sections or subsections of the enactment. In contrast, amendatory lan-
guage, even of the non-Batterton variety, is inserted directly into the underlying Act and can be
easily targeted to specific provisions.
144. The draftsman could provide that regulations shall be issued to implement the statu-
tory term "- ," as added by the amendment made by section - of the Act. Cf Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 122(h)(2), 96 Stat. 324, (codified
as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 1 (1988)). The Act states that:
[i]n order to provide for the timely implementation of the amendments made by this
Act, the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall, not later than September 1,
1983, promulgate such final regulations as may be necessary to set forth ... the
standards for payment for hospice care under part A of title XVIII of [the Social
Security Act], pursuant to section 1814(i) of such Act [as added by an amendment
made by the statutory enactment].
[Vol. 39:725
When a Delegation Is Not a Delegation
as where the specific provision is the key provision in a particular section or
subsection of a bill, even the most unfocused freestanding delegation should
suffice to trigger rulemaking with the desired specificity.
The more specific the reference to a particular amendatory term or provi-
sion, the more closely the rulemaking delegation resembles the amendatory
language that has invoked the express delegation rule. Perhaps at some
point, particularly in the case of an amendatory delegation, a court would be
inclined to view the language as a specific delegation intended to give legisla-
tive effect to an agency's rulemaking. On the other hand, the Batterton line
of Supreme Court cases have all involved the use of a particular type of
amendatory delegation. 4' It is entirely possible, and perhaps likely, the
draftsman's use of specifically targeted freestanding language, or even appro-
priate amendatory language, may preclude courts from applying the Bat-
terton standard in favor of the Chevron lawmaking gap analysis.
1 46
If no ironclad, practicable method exists for ensuring specific legislative
control over agency decisionmaking without inadvertently providing defer-
ence to the agency's construction of a statutory provision, the above discus-
sion at least suggests viable alternatives that might succeed where the
prevailing use of express amendatory language has failed. Where decision-
making control is of genuine concern to the lawmakers, these alternatives
should be considered by the legislative draftsman. Further, while concerns
about agency control are legitimate and undoubtedly present in some cir-
cumstances where the amendatory language is used, the use of such language
results at least as often from the general workings of the congressional
agency legislative partnership as from any desire to ensure control over the
manner of agency decisionmaking. In many cases, the language simply re-
flects the prevailing sense, expressed haphazardly with reference to specific
amendatory provisions, that some lawmaking gap often is left for agency
Id
145. For example, "as determined under standards prescribed by the Secretary." See supra
notes 62-66 and accompanying text (discussing post-Batterton case law).
146. Although not intended to give substantially more deference to agency action (as pre-
sumed under Batterton), the "as determined under..." amendatory delegation is more reason-
ably read as a statement of deference than are other rulemaking delegations. Thus, apart from
the fact that controlling Supreme Court precedent applies solely to that type of amendatory
delegation, use of the other types of rulemaking delegations is less likely to result in heightened
deference to an agency's rulemaking. See infra notes 148-65 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing recent case involving non-Batterton amendatory delegation in which the Batterton standard
was not invoked by the government). But cf Sullivan v. Zebley, 110 S. Ct. 885, 890 (1990)
(Court applying Batterton-like standard to invalidate agency regulations promulgated under
non-Batterton amendatory delegation).
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consumption. 147 Certainly, the indiscriminate use of specific amendatory
delegations, which are redundant in many circumstances and dangerously
misleading under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, should be discontin-
ued. Indeed, where there is no immediate control concern, such delegations
should be studiously avoided. As long as the Supreme Court continues to
embrace the Batterton standard, lawmakers must draft with an eye on pre-
serving legislative meaning in the application of statutory provisions subject
to agency construction.
IV. OHIO V. UNITED STA TES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR:
CHEVRON, SPECIFIC DELEGATIONS, AND THE PRECISE
QUESTION AT ISSUE
The major themes explored in this Article recently came to the forefront
in Ohio v. United States Department of the Interior.4 ' In what may be the
most significant amplification of Chevron to date, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, per Chief Judge Wald, invali-
dated a portion of an agency regulation promulgated under a specific
rulemaking delegation. 149 Over the agency's objection that its regulation
was required to be followed by the court, virtually without any consideration
of legislative meaning, the court relied heavily on the "precise question at
issue" component of the Chevron standard to provide meaningful review of
the regulatory challenge within the Chevron step one framework.
In Department of the Interior, Congress specifically delegated to the
agency the responsibility for establishing regulations that identified "'the
best available procedures'" for determining damages "'for injury to, de-
struction of, or loss of natural resources resulting from a release of oil or a
hazardous substance.' "1 0 The regulations were to "'take into considera-
147. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text (arguing that a specific rulemaking
delegation is not intended to connote extreme deference to agency action).
148. 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
149. In addition to its use of Chevron to invalidate an agency regulation issued under spe-
cific rulemaking authority, the court in Dep't of the Interior employed the Chevron framework
to reject the government's claim that its regulatory construction had been ratified by a "reen-
actment" of the statutory provision. Id. at 457-59. See generally Eskridge, Interpreting Legis-
lative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67 (1988) (discussing legislative ratification doctrine). The
court strongly suggested that an agency construction unable to survive step one review under
Chevron, based on examination of the original statutory enactment, should not be sustained on
the basis of subsequent legislative developments. See Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d at 458
(court stating that it "would be reluctant to hold that the failure to amend an already-clear
statutory command generates 'ambiguity' where none existed before").
150. See Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d at 442-43 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(1)-(2)
(1988)). The statute actually delegated the rulemaking authority to the President, who then
assigned the responsibility to the Department of the Interior. Id. at 443.
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tion factors including, but not limited to, replacement value, use value, and
ability of the ecosystem or resource to recover.' "5 Significantly, the
rulemaking delegation, although included in the amendatory language, was
not the type of amendatory delegation that had elicited heightened deference
under Batterton.'
52
Predictably, the agency claimed that the regulation was entitled to almost
unlimited deference.153 The agency did not, however, invoke the Batterton
line of authority in support of its claim of deference. 154 Thus, perhaps be-
cause of the nature of the rulemaking delegation chosen by the draftsman,
the court did not review the regulation under the deferential rulemaking gap
analysis of Batterton.
Instead, the agency relied on the Chevron framework to substantiate its
claim of deference. Specifically, the agency argued that by authorizing the
agency to promulgate regulations governing the assessment of damages,
Congress had left to the agency "the decision of what the measure of dam-
ages will be."'" Under this view, the presence of the specific delegation
meant that Congress had not spoken to the precise question at issue, and the
agency's regulation had to be reviewed under step two of Chevron.156 Thus,
although the agency did not rely on Batterton per se, the agency attempted to
secure Batterton deference by exploiting the specific rulemaking delegation
to end run step one of the Chevron analysis.
The District of Columbia Circuit rejected the agency's argument, recog-
nizing that a specific delegation of rulemaking authority did not relieve the
court of the obligation to employ " 'traditional tools of statutory construc-
tion'" to determine if Congress had evinced a specific legislative meaning
that restricted agency action. 57 In synthesizing the Chevron standard, the
court reafflirmed that Chevron requires a reviewing court to look beyond the
statutory language at issue in assessing the validity of an agency construc-
tion. According to the court:
Whether Congress had made its intent clear and unambiguous
does not depend on whether a particular phrase of the statutory
151. See 880 F.2d at 444 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(2) (1988)).
152. The amendatory language provided that the agency "shall promulgate regulations
for" determining the damages, and directed that "[s]uch regulations" had to take into account
certain factors. 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(l)-(2) (1988).
153. Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d at 443.
154. Id. at 442-43.
155. Id at 442.
156. See id at 443 (setting forth agency's argument that since Congress "delegated the
matter" to the agency, the case "is governed by Chevron Step Two" and the agency's rule
"must be upheld if not unreasonable or inconsistent with the statutory purpose").
157. Id at 441 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)).
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text standing all alone resolves the matter .... "It is a fundamental
canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be
read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall
statutory scheme." '
Accordingly, a reviewing court must study "the statutory text, structure and
history" to determine whether the agency has contravened clearly expressed
congressional intent. 5 9
In rejecting the agency's argument that its regulatory construction was
entitled to step two Chevron analysis, the court focused on the "precise ques-
tion at issue" factor of the Chevron discourse. The court emphasized that
the precise issue in the case was not "what measure of damages should apply
in any or all cases which are brought under the Act." Rather, the court
articulated the issue as the far more "discrete" question of whether the
agency could select the disputed measure. 1" Thus, while the agency had
been delegated a "considerable measure of discretion" in formulating an
overall standard for measuring damages,161 consistent with the traditional
"empowering arrangement" between Congress and agencies,' 62 the agency
was not, by virtue of its specifically delegated authority, given unbridled pol-
icy discretion in implementing the statutory provision.
Having delimited the scope of judicial inquiry, the court "submerge[d]"
itself "in the minutiae of [the statutory] text and legislative materials."' 6 a
The court concluded that the regulation was invalid because the agency had
restricted the measure of damages when Congress had intended that it be
broadened. 1 While the agency was given considerable latitude to use its
expertise in formulating regulatory standards, it could not establish stan-
dards that failed to give effect to a specific congressional preference revealed
by the statutory context and legislative history. 165 In sum, notwithstanding
the agency's specifically delegated rulemaking authority, the court relied
heavily on an exhaustive examination of the legislative history and statutory
context, and invalidated the agency regulation under step one of Chevron. By
doing so, the court firmly established that Chevron can provide meaningful
158. Id. (quoting Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 109 S. Ct. 1500, 1504 (1989)).
159. Id.
160. Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d at 443. The issue was whether the agency was "entitled
to treat use value and restoration cost as having equal presumptive legitimacy as a measure of
damages." Id. The agency's "'lesser of' [restoration or replacement costs] rule squarely re-
ject[ed] the concept of any clearly expressed congressional preference for recovering the full
cost of restoration from responsible parties." Id at 444.
161. Id at 443.
162. Monaghan, supra note 91, at 27.
163. Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d at 442.
164. Id. at 450-52.
165. Id.
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review of agency constructions formulated under specific rulemaking
authority.
V. CONCLUSION
It is inevitable that a certain amount of lawmaking responsibility is going
to cede to those entities responsible for overseeing the application of statu-
tory provisions in specific cases. The notion that courts exercise such re-
sponsibility in many circumstances has been recognized in academic
literature for years, if not fully realized in the actual decisions of judges.
Agencies owe the same fidelity to congressional intent as do courts. Seem-
ingly, they would be required to give the same effect to discernible legislative
meaning as would their judicial counterparts. Yet, historically, there has
been an ill-defined perception that agency constructions are immune from
the rigorous application of the tools of statutory construction which, at least
in theory, characterize judicial application of statutory provisions.
This perception appears to stem, in part, from the fact that agencies, un-
like courts, are invited to act in a legislative capacity in implementing statu-
tory enactments.' 66 How can Congress delegate rulemaking and still insist
on strict adherence to legislative meaning? The answer is that Congress can
and frequently does. It simply misconceives the unique legislative partner-
ship between Congress and administrative agencies, and stretches congres-
sional intent beyond the breaking point, to hold that the traditional signposts
of legislative meaning are not to be followed in the administrative context
simply because Congress has called for rulemaking with respect to the statu-
tory provision in question.
In Chevron, the Supreme Court took a tentative step toward reaffirming
the principle that it is the role of the judiciary to ensure that a clearly ascer-
tainable intent of Congress is given effect in the application of statutes. Post-
Chevron judicial decisions have clarified that the lawmaking gaps derived
from an exhaustive search for legislative meaning, not the gaps of rulemak-
ing delegations, define the zone of judicial deference to agency decisionmak-
ing. Unfortunately, the Batterton line of specific delegation cases prevents
full implementation of the lawmaking gap approach. The Court should
make clear that step one of Chevron applies in any rulemaking context. In
the interim, lower courts can lead the way by invoking the Chevron standard
regardless of the manner in which rulemaking is delegated. 67 For their
166. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text (describing basis for view that an agency
rulemaking is entitled to greater deference).
167. Certainly, where the precise Batterton -like delegation language is not involved, a court
should be free to review the case within the Chevron framework. Even where that type of
delegation is involved, there are legitimate (indeed persuasive) grounds for holding that the
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part, legislative practitioners must take care to avoid language that will inad-
vertently result in unwarranted deference to the product of agency
rulemaking.
court must review the agency regulation under step one of Chevron. See supra note 77 (arguing
that Chevron can be read to require enforcement of specific legislative meaning notwithstand-
ing the interpretative format).
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